Trump Tariff Winds Shifting: Navigating Post-IEEPA Waters After the Supreme Court Decision

On February 20, 2026, the US Supreme Court decided in Learning Resources, Inc., et al. v. Trump, that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not give the president the authority to impose tariffs, fully striking down of the Trump Administration’s IEEPA-based tariffs. 

The Court upheld rulings by the US Court of International Trade (CIT) and the US District Court for the District of Columbia (DDC), discussed in our previous posts. 

Five key takeaways from this decision are:

1. Some Trump tariffs remain: Only the Trump Administration’s IEEPA-based tariffs have been struck down, while tariffs under other authorities like Section 232 remain in place.
2. Refunds may not come easily or quickly: Importers should generally be entitled to refunds of IEEPA-based tariffs paid and can begin preparing to file for refunds now.
3. Possibly more stable tariff environment: The threat of whipsawing and nearly instantaneous tariffs is likely to subside.
4. New limited tariffs threatened: Importers should expect new tariffs under the tariff-specific authorities, as President Trump threatened immediately after this Supreme Court decision was released.
5. Open questions remain:  It is not yet clear what the Trump Administration will do with trade agreements premised on IEEPA-based tariffs and how refunds will be calculated or administered.

Most Trump Tariffs Struck Down; Some Remain

The Trump Administration imposed a broad array of tariffs in 2025 (and threatened many more), many of which relied on the emergency powers delegated to the president under IEEPA.  The Court’s comprehensive ruling that the president cannot use IEEPA to impose tariffs means many of the Administration’s tariffs are now unlawful.

In particular, the tariffs that have been struck down include (i) “reciprocal” tariffs on from essentially every country in the world; (ii) “fentanyl” tariffs on China, Canada, and Mexico; and (iii) Brazil-specific tariffs. 

President Trump also took action under IEEPA to establish the framework for “secondary” tariffs on purchasers of Venezuelan, Russian, and Iranian oil.  Under the Court’s ruling, these tariff programs, which never ultimately resulted in the imposition of secondary tariffs, are also unlawful.

The Court did not consider, and its ruling does not impact, current or potential future tariffs imposed under other authorities, including Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Section 301 of the Trade Act, and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930.  As such, the new tariffs that will remain in place include those covering aluminum, steel, automobiles and parts, copper, semiconductor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, medium- and heavy- duty trucks and parts, and timber and lumber. The president has also used tariff-specific authorities to initiate investigations on critical minerals, pharmaceutical products, polysilicon and its derivatives, drones and their components, certain medical equipment and devices, wind turbines and their parts and components, and robotics and industrial machinery.

Tariff Refund Outlook

As previewed in a prior post, importers should not generally need to sue now to preserve their right to a potential post‑decision refund.  In December 2025, the CIT held that importers do not need to file lawsuits to protect refund rights if the Supreme Court ultimately strikes down IEEPA‑based tariffs, including for liquidated or un‑protested entries.  That remains consistent with the Trump Administration’s representation in a May 2025 court filing that refunds with interest will issue if the tariffs are deemed unlawful.

The Supreme Court’s ruling does not address how tariffs should be refunded.  The Trump Administration may potentially take steps to avoid issuing cash refunds or make any refund process burdensome.  As such, importers may face a potentially time-consuming refund process.  

The combination of silence from the Court and signals from the Administration could indicate a potentially lengthy refund process for importers. Additionally, importers may face challenges when calculating the IEEPA-based tariffs actually paid and run up against administrative backlogs at CBP.

The Trump Administration’s “Plan B”

Since the initial ruling by CIT in May 2025, the Administration has telegraphed its plan to pursue tariffs under other authorities.  In sum, non-IEEPA tariff authorities might be used to effectively reconstruct many of the IEEPA-based tariffs the Court struck down, however, likely in a more limited manner.

In particular, the Trump Administration could use the following tariff-specific authorities to impose more limited tariffs in lieu of the IEEPA-based tariffs:

• Section 122: Immediately after the ruling on February 20, President Trump imposed a 10% global tariff under Section 122.  This section authorizes the president to impose temporary, global tariffs to address major balance‑of‑payments issues or unfair practices.  Section 122 tariffs are limited, however, to 15% and a maximum of 150 days (absent extension of that time period by Congress).  
• Section 232: Permits tariffs on imports that threaten national security, following an investigation.  Already widely used to impose sector-specific tariffs on imported products including steel, aluminum, copper, autos, semiconductors, and other sectors, with additional investigations underway.
• Section 301: Authorizes tariffs responding to unreasonable or discriminatory foreign practices.  Currently supports broad tariffs on Chinese goods, with new probes targeting key Chinese industries.
• Section 338: Allows up to 50% duties against countries that explicitly discriminate against US commerce, though this authority has never been used to impose tariffs.

Without IEEPA‑based tariff power, President Trump is left primarily with authorities that are slower, sector‑specific, time-limited, or procedurally constrained—a sharp contrast with the free‑ranging tariff leverage he exercised through IEEPA in 2025.  For example, Section 232 requires a months‑long investigation before tariffs may be imposed, and Section 301 requires a formal investigation and findings of unreasonable or discriminatory foreign conduct.  These tools allow for aggressive trade actions, but they do not support the kind of immediate tariff threats that previously enabled high‑pressure negotiations.

Trade Agreements in Doubt

It is not yet clear what happens to the new trade agreements negotiated to reduce the now‑invalidated IEEPA-based tariffs.  Over the course of 2025, the Administration struck several notable trade framework agreements with key trading partners—including the UK Economic Prosperity Deal, US-Japan agreement, Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal, and United States–Switzerland–Liechtenstein Agreement.  These agreements exchanged reduced IEEPA‑based tariffs for trade concessions.  The premise of these trade agreements has evaporated; however, the Administration might try to take steps to continue enforcing the negotiated tariff rates.

The Court’s decision emphasized that the President lacks inherent tariff‑setting power absent clear congressional authorization, underscoring that tariffs of this magnitude require explicit statutory grounding.  At the same time, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent warned that the ruling may produce significant practical consequences in the near term, including uncertainty around unwinding actions taken during the tariff period.  As a result, there may be near-term uncertainty about the lawfulness of the enforcement of IEEPA-based trade deals.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision is rightly seen as a victory for importers opposed to IEEPA-based tariffs.  At the same time, importers that had hoped for a clear, deceive, and final end to the Trump Administration’s use of tariffs as a political tool might come away disappointed.  In the near-term, it is expected that there will continue to be developments on tariff refunds and future tariffs.